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NO-FAULT DIVORCE LAWS:
AN OVERVIEW AND CRITIQUE*
JAMES T. McHUGH**
Introduction
D URING THE past five years there has been a growing trend through-
out the country in favor of a general revision of divorce legislation.
Fifteen to twenty years ago the focus was on establishing a national di-
vorce law to replace the widely divergent laws in the various states. The
present trend, however, focuses on the model statute developed by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, popu-
larly referred to as "no-fault divorce law." The model statute was studied
by the Family Law Section of the American Bar Association and some
changes have been made. But the Family Law Section in its 1971 Mid-
year Report recommended that the model statute not be approved by the
ABA. At its annual meeting in February, 1972, the ABA rejected the
model law.
Nonetheless, some type of no-fault legislation--or something de-
scribed as such-has been proposed in a number of states and already
adopted in some.
Consequently, it is the purpose of this paper to provide an over-
view of the present situation, to describe the no-fault proposal and to
emphasize its weaknesses, and to provide some recommendations in re-
gard to legislative proposals. It is hoped that the analysis and suggestions
will serve as a basis for further consideration on the part of lawyers,
social workers and those involved in marriage and family life work. This
paper is not a theological treatise on the indissolubility of marriage, nor
*Reprinted from 32 THE JURIST 226 (1972).
** United States Catholic Conference.
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is it intended in any way to be a justifica-
tion for divorce. But the causes of divorce
and the present legislative trends face us
with pastoral problems of serious import,
and these are quite definitely the concern
of the Family Life Division of the United
States Catholic Conference. Accordingly,
some pastoral recommendations are also
included in the concluding section.
The Present Situation
Although it is commonly estimated that
between one-quarter and one-third of all
American marriages end in divorce, a
careful study of marriage and divorce
released in October, 1971, by the U.S.
Census Bureau showed that the figures
have to be analyzed more closely to get an
accurate picture of the divorce situation.
This study, conducted in 1967, for couples
married during the previous 20 years, pre-
sented the following facts:
a) Four-fifths of the whites and two-thirds
of the Negroes married in the 20-year pe-
riod preceding 1967 had been married only
once.
b) Youthful marriages are most risky.
Thus, 28% of men marrying before age 22
were divorced, while only 13% of those
marrying after age 22 were divorced. For
women, the figures were 27% before age
20, as compared to 14% after age 20.
c) The rate of divorce was higher in all
categories for Negroes, for those in the
lower economic strata, and for migrants.
Reasons for the Proposed Revisions
of the Laws
The laws governing divorce vary from
state to state, and while the laws on the
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books seem strict, the actual administration
of the law seems lenient. Moreover, mar-
riage counselors and social scientists point
out that the statutory grounds for divorce
are seldom, if ever, the real causes of mar-
riage breakdown. Finally, fast and easy di-
vorce has been available for many years in
Mexico, and more recently in the Domini-
can Republic and Haiti.
At any rate, the reasons given for a revi-
sion of present divorce laws usually in-
clude:
a) Concern for fair and equitable treat-
ment for all persons who require divorce,
regardless of socio-economic status.
b) Determination to avoid the dishonest
charges often made as grounds for divorce
and the acrimony that accompanies the
divorce proceedings.
c) Desire to alleviate the harm done to
children by long and often dishonest pro-
ceedings.
d) An attempt to release the court of the
task of making judgments in matters that
are highly subjective and emotion-laden.
e) Marital breakdown is seldom the fault
of only one party; in most cases it is ex-
tremely difficult to delineate clearly who is
most responsible.
f) Once the couple enter into divorce pro-
ceedings, it is hardly likely that they will
be turned back by the law, the courts, the
church, or social disapproval. Therefore,
the law should seek to grant them what
they want as smoothly as possible, with
proper safeguards for personal rights.
There is considerable truth to these argu-
ments and to others like them. But divorce
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legislation is only one aspect of marriage
legislation, and perhaps a far broader ex-
amination of laws affecting marriage and
family life is necessary before an ideal di-
vorce law can be established. For instance,
in light of the statistics on young marriages,
perhaps age for marriage should be reex-
amined.
The New Proposals
Obtaining a divorce has customarily de-
pended on proving that some legal ground
was present in the specific case. Grounds
for divorce included desertion, physical or
mental cruelty, adultery, etc. Verification
of the guilt of the offending party was not
only the justification for the divorce, but
was very often a powerful influence in the
awarding of alimony and the distribution
of the possessions.
At any rate, no-fault divorce is looked
upon as a radical departure from the past
system. There are no grounds for divorce
other than the irretrievable breakdown of
the marriage. There is no necessity to de-
termine who is guilty for the breakdown of
the marriage, but simply the necessity to
verify that it is irretrievably broken. There
are various legal proposals now being dis-
cussed, and the ABA's Family Law Section
unanimously accepted "irretrievable break-
down" as the exclusive ground for divorce
if acceptable and appropriate guidelines are
provided so that the concept is workable
and so that the new law applies some
brakes on impetuous divorce and better
safeguards the public interest in the family.
Herewith are the variations of approach
now being considered under the concept of
no-fault divorce.
1. Irretrievable Breakdown
The couple petition the court for disso-
lution of marriage on the basis that the
marriage is irretrievably broken. Either
party or both parties may petition. A hear-
ing is held for the court to determine that
the allegation is true and to hear the re-
sponse of the non-petitioning party. If the
court finds the marriage broken, it declares
the marriage dissolved and presides over
the property settlement. No attempt is made
to assess guilt or fault. The whole proceed-
ing could be finished in little more than 90
days.
The basic difficulties of the breakdown
theory are (1) establishing objective crite-
ria that can be applied to indicate the
breakdown of marriage; and (2) establish-
ing some manageable procedure to verify
that the criteria have been met in each case.
Without some cooling off period for coun-
seling or attempted reconciliation, the court
may never be able to verify the reasons for
the declaration. Moreover, the speed with
which the dissolution can be accomplished
allows little chance for a sober re-evaluation
by the parties.
In some states provision is made for
some reconciliation attempt or for some
marriage counseling. In California, the old
grounds-adultery, desertion, cruelty, etc.
-can be cited as evidence of breakdown.
Once the traditional grounds or fault
concepts are entered, even as corroboration
of the breakdown, the parties-and judges
and lawyers-begin to think in the old
categories.
Although the simple irretrievable break-
down system is theoretically appealing, it
has not found ready acceptance. It seldom
allows for any after-thoughts or reconcili-
ation, and as evidenced by the ABA action
in February, 1972, it probably will not gain
nationwide legal endorsement until some
changes are made.
2. Breakdown Plus Separation
In order to follow the no-fault concept,
some jurisdictions are considering a law
that combines the breakdown theory with
a period of separation. The couple appear
in court and assert that the marriage is ir-
retrievably broken, and then live separate
and apart for a period of one or two years.
(If only one party appears, the time may
be increased to anything from two to five
years.) If, at the conclusion of the stipu-
lated time, there has been no reconciliation
nor any other reason to prolong the waiting
period, the court grants the divorce-which
takes effect immediately. No other grounds
are needed or considered as reasons for the
court decree.
3. Difficulties of the New Proposals
Granting that our present legal system
for divorce is inadequate in many respects,
these new proposals at least try to avoid the
ideological pitfalls of the fault system. How-
ever, their weakness lies in the fact that
they assume a social system and patterns
of behavior that do not now exist. The
following are some of the specific weak-
nesses of the new proposals:
a) The presumption is that both hus-
band and wife can separate and begin a
new life on equal grounds. In fact, a
woman who has been away from her pro-
fession, previous employment, or area of
skill for a five- to ten-year period does not
easily find a way to support herself.
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b) The emphasis in the new divorce
laws is placed on the relationship between
husband and wife. There is an assumption
that a fair process decreases the possibility
of anyone being hurt. But the child always
suffers some harm, and these proposals
really do not come to grips with that.
c) Although recognition of reconcilia-
tion and counseling is inherent in the new
laws, very little provision is generally made
by the state to assure availability of service.
Indeed, there is little more than token ac-
knowledgement of the value of a broad-
based domestic court system, with adequate
social services.
d) Since other sections of the law are
not always brought up to date with the di-
vorce law, there is the danger that a fair
and equitable financial arrangement will
not be achieved.
e) Any serious attempt to revise divorce
laws should also include some attempt to
get at the sources of marital instability. Age
at marriage, degree of preparation, extenu-
ating circumstances (e.g., out-of-wedlock
pregnancy) are factors that society must
also consider in granting the marriage li-
cense.
f) Because children suffer greater emo-
tional and material deprivation from di-
vorce, perhaps some form of independent
representation should be arranged to pro-
tect their rights and assure them of future
opportunities that they might otherwise
have enjoyed.
g) In any case, enforcement of the
court's mandates should be ensured to pro-
tect the rights of all concerned.
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Pastoral Suggestions
Divorce and divorce laws are a fact of
life in contemporary America. It is hardly
likely that any divorce law can be looked
upon as good, because its very existence is
a testimony to the breakdown of "the in-
timate partnership of married life and love
[that] has been established by the Creator
and qualified by his laws, and is rooted in
the conjugal covenant of irrevocable per-
sonal consent" (Gaudium et Spes, No. 48).
Regrettably, however, some marriages do
in fact break down, and the Church must
take this into account in attempting to fulfill
her pastoral responsibilities in the area of
marriage and family life. Consequently,
without entering upon the question of
pastoral care for the divorced and for those
in second marriages, the following recom-
mendations are proposed:
a) On the strength of the statistical evi-
dence regarding the breakdown of marriage
for those marrying young, for the poor, and
for migrants, the Church should increase
her pastoral commitment for these groups.
A system of special counseling for the
young and for those pregnant before mar-
riage should be established in every diocese.
This would delay hasty marriages, perhaps
permanently for some. It is not so much a
question of refusing the sacrament as taking
definite steps to insure its proper reception.
Pre-marriage programs such as pre-Cana
and high school marriage programs should
be increased. Some specialized programs
should be set up for the poor and for
migrants.
Although family stability seems stronger
in the Spanish-speaking population, we
should expect an erosion here because there
is so much mobility and migration in this
population. Definite programs to compen-
sate for the mobility will strengthen family
life.
b) Marriage counseling services should
be increased at every level. In addition to
professional counseling services, priests and
seminarians should be given the opportunity
to learn basic counseling skills and to rec-
ognize the causes of marital instability.
c) In every diocese, and certainly in
every state conference, a special committee
of lawyers, counselors, physicians, and
family life personnel should be established
to monitor state domestic relations laws.
This committee should be able to detect
trends that will lead to legal change and
should anticipate legislative initiatives suf-
ficiently in advance to comment knowl-
edgeably or formulate alternatives.
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